Based on its nuclear and missile capabilities and the deepening defense cooperation with Russia, the nuclear-armed North Korea is refining tools that could allow it its own version of a rapid and high-impact attack.
According to an analysis by Modern Diplomacy, in June 1967, as the sun rose over the Eastern Mediterranean, Israeli fighter squadrons, flying at low altitude along the coasts, struck Egyptian air bases with a devastating blow. Within just a few hours, most of the Egyptian Air Force had been destroyed.
Operation Focus was not merely the opening of the Six-Day War, but determined its final outcome.
When ground operations advanced into Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, Israel had already secured its critical military advantage, namely air supremacy.
The Six-Day War remains a classic example of how a short, sharp, and highly concentrated conflict can overturn assumptions of regional deterrence and reshape the long-term strategic reality.
Nearly 60 years later, a very different state is studying similar lessons. Based on its nuclear and missile capabilities and the deepening of defense cooperation with the Russians, the nuclear-armed North Korea is developing means that could allow it its own version of a rapid and high-impact attack.
North Korea’s KN-23 and KN-24 missiles, semi-ballistic systems based on the Russian Iskander-M, feature irregular low-altitude trajectories designed to complicate missile defense. Through their recent use by Russia against Ukraine, North Korea acquired invaluable real-world operational data, accelerating improvements in accuracy, reliability, and in-flight maneuverability. Moreover, thanks to Russian assistance, advanced technology, training, and possible space-oriented targeting support, Pyongyang secures capabilities that were previously inaccessible.
The strategic danger does not lie in whether Pyongyang could literally replicate Operation Focus.
The real danger lies in the possibility that Kim Jong-un may draw erroneous lessons from the Six-Day War and the Russia-Ukraine war, that surprise attack, speed, and concentrated firepower can overwhelm an opponent before an effective response is activated. If Pyongyang becomes convinced that a blitzkrieg is feasible or judges that nuclear coercion could suspend the intervention of the United States and Japan for a specific period, incentives for war may increase.
How North Korea could attempt a Six-Day War-style blitzkrieg
The perception that the balance has shifted puts today’s Korean Peninsula at risk.
North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are expanding both in scale and accuracy. At the same time, the country’s SRBM and MLRS systems can strike nearly all major air bases and command and control hubs (C2) in South Korea. North Korea’s special operations forces, trained for decades in infiltration via tunnels, submarines, and UAV drops, are closely analyzing Russian tactics in the Russia-Ukraine war, from loitering munitions to precise targeting of critical infrastructure.
Pyongyang may imagine that by combining missile barrages, drone swarms, electronic interference, special forces infiltration, and nuclear escalation, it could paralyze South Korea’s initial response in the first hours of war and create a substantive rupture in alliance cohesion.
Here the Six-Day War offers a second powerful lesson.
The initial phase of war matters more than any other. In 1967, Israel’s preemptive strike eliminated Arab air forces on the ground, granting unlimited air supremacy to the IDF.
Although North Korea could not achieve air superiority, it could attempt something functionally similar, to deprive the United States, Japan, and South Korea of the ability to conduct normal operations in the first hours of war.
This could include simultaneous missile saturation of air defense batteries, fuel depots, hardened aircraft shelters, runways, and long-range sensors.
At the same time, missiles with irregular trajectories could evade radar detection and attempt to penetrate interception layers that include PAC-3, L-SAM, THAAD, and Aegis destroyers. Drone swarms could overwhelm short-range air defenses or neutralize fuel depots and mobile C2 vehicles. Cyber operations and GPS jamming would complement such kinetic attacks, creating friction and delays in the alliance’s response cycle.
Ultimately, Pyongyang could conduct its own reversed version of Operation Focus, not to secure air supremacy, but to prevent its adversaries from achieving it. This would allow North Korea to conduct special forces infiltration, limited armored advances around the DMZ, and nuclear coercion to deter reinforcements.
Such an operation would rely on the same logic, the ideal combination of shock, speed, and confusion, that Israel demonstrated in Sinai and the Golan Heights.
Deterring a blitzkrieg, lessons for the United States, Japan, and South Korea
Using the Six-Day War as a reference point, the United States, Japan, and South Korea can identify ways to deter the above challenges from North Korea.
Israel’s victory in 1967 was achieved not solely through air superiority, but also thanks to the resilience of its mobilization system and the adaptability of its reserve forces. After securing air supremacy, the IDF rapidly mobilized reserves, stabilized key fronts, and executed critical maneuvers before the Arab states coordinated among themselves.
Similarly, North Korea may use intensive special forces operations in the initial phase of war to create chaos in South Korea, reproducing the disorganization experienced by Israel’s adversaries in 1967, with attacks on leadership, transportation, and communication hubs.
The solution is clear.
If South Korea manages to prevent internal paralysis in the first 24 to 48 hours of war, North Korea’s ambitious surprise attack will largely fail. Therefore, Seoul should treat protection against special forces, urban defense, and the resilience of civilian and military structures at a level equivalent to “air superiority.”
This means dispersal of C2, strengthening police and reserve forces, hardening communications, and ensuring that local governments can function fully even under missile strikes and special forces infiltration.
Regardless of the intensity of the initial barrage, the state must survive, maintain cohesion, and prepare for counteractions.
The political legacy of the 1967 war also offers an important lesson.
Israel’s rapid victory created long-term strategic burdens, the issue of occupation, regional reactions, and legitimacy disputes.
It demonstrates that a short and decisive war can produce unpredictable, long-lasting side effects.
Applying this lesson to the Korean Peninsula, the United States and its allies must have a clear picture of the possibility of failure of a North Korean surprise attack or even of regime change.
Issues such as the security of weapons of mass destruction, potential Chinese intervention, refugee flows, humanitarian stabilization, and the restructuring of North Korea’s political order cannot be handled improvisationally.
The strategic task for Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul is to deprive Pyongyang of any illusion of a short war, as emphasized in the analysis.
Deterrence must rest on the certainty that North Korea cannot achieve in 6 hours what Israel achieved in 6 days. To make this happen, integration of missile defense systems, real-time intelligence sharing, strengthening the survivability of air bases, dispersal of critical assets, and rapid counterattack capabilities are required.
In addition, the United States and its allies should build a political foundation capable of withstanding a war of attrition, a type of conflict that North Korea cannot endure.
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