The tenth anniversary of the attempted overthrow of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan brings to light the unseen aspects of the strategic decision that changed the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. The highly publicized purchase of the Russian S-400s by Erdogan—a move that led to the country’s expulsion from the F-35 program—was not a simple geopolitical turn. It was a move of absolute personal survival. And this is because, as is revealed, Erdogan feared his very own Air Force.
Turkey-US relations after the 2016 coup attempt
Turkey, a member of NATO since 1952 and the only majority-Muslim country in the alliance besides Albania, was long one of Washington's key partners in the region. However, the failed 2016 coup attempt in Turkey and the mutual suspicions that followed radically changed this dynamic. One of the clearest manifestations of this shift was Turkey's historic decision to purchase the Russian S-400 air defense system, marking the first and only time a NATO member has acquired a major Russian air defense platform. The S-400 deal, finalized in 2017 with deliveries starting in 2019, was widely seen as a direct result of the climate that emerged after the coup. The consequences were immediate and severe: Turkey was removed from the F-35 fighter jet program (Joint Strike Fighter - JSF), even though it had been one of its most important international partners and had already invested huge sums of money in it. Seven years later, the strategic cost of that decision remains visible. Turkey’s S-400 systems were never integrated into its air defense network and remain in warehouses. Meanwhile, regional rivals like Israel and Greece have successfully integrated the F-35 into their air forces, gaining a significant qualitative advantage over Ankara.
The scenario of transferring the S-400s to a third country
Ten years after the 2016 coup, in many ways, Turkey's geopolitics have come full circle. During the recent NATO summit in Ankara, US President Donald Trump expressed a desire to sell F-35 fighter jets to Turkey, following years of lobbying by Ankara. At the same time, reports indicate that Turkey could sell the S-400 air defense system to a Gulf country, most likely the United Arab Emirates (UAE) or Qatar, to secure its reinstatement into the F-35 program. As Turkey readjusts its strategic positioning, the tenth anniversary of the 2016 coup offers a good opportunity to reexamine the long-term consequences of the choices Ankara made in the post-coup environment.
The Turkish S-400 deal
In 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet near the Syrian-Turkish border, leading Turkey (a NATO member state) and Russia down a dangerous path. Russia immediately suspended all trade relations with Turkey and demanded an apology from President Erdogan himself. Yet just two years later, the Turkish president surprised everyone by signing a $2.5 billion USD deal to procure four S-400 batteries. In doing so, he not only reconciled with Moscow but also became the first and only NATO country to buy an advanced Russian air defense system. Although three other NATO countries, including Greece, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, possess the Russian S-300 air defense system, none of them bought it directly from Moscow. Bulgaria and Slovakia inherited their S-300 batteries from the era before the end of the Cold War, when they received these air defense systems as members of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. Similarly, the Greek S-300 batteries were actually purchased by Cyprus (a non-NATO member) in 1997.
However, Turkey opposed the deal and threatened military action if Cyprus deployed the S-300s. This raised the possibility of a direct conflict between Greece and Turkey, both of whom are NATO members. Eventually, a compromise was reached, and Cyprus agreed to transfer the already-purchased S-300 air defense system to Greece. Therefore, when Erdogan signed the S-400 deal with Russia in 2017, Turkey became the first NATO country in nearly seven decades to buy a Russian/Soviet air defense system. This was a dramatic turn compared to 2015, when Turkey had shot down the Russian fighter.
The US role in the coup
What had changed in just two years? The only possible explanation is the 2016 coup against Erdogan, which many in Turkey believe was executed with the direct knowledge or even the assistance of the US. On the other hand, Washington argued that Turkey's operation of the S-400 systems would allow the collection of confidential information regarding the F-35's radar. This information would end up in Russia almost immediately, thereby compromising the capabilities of the F-35 worldwide. However, if certain assessments are to be believed, Erdogan wanted the S-400s precisely for this capability—their ability to shoot down American-made fighter jets. "Both the political and military aspects of the S-400 decision made sense, to the extent that Erdogan's top priority was his own political survival," the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) stated in a research paper. During the 2016 coup, a rogue faction of the Turkish military rose up against Erdogan. In particular, the Turkish Air Force played a major role in the coup. Turkish Air Force F-16 fighter jets bombed the country's parliament and the presidential palace in Ankara. F-16s even chased and threatened Erdogan's own plane. Erdogan managed to mobilize the crowds, who took to the streets, and the coup was ultimately thwarted. In the months that followed, Erdogan sought to shield the country against new coups through mass arrests and purges, reportedly removing about 2,600 military personnel, including half of Turkey’s fighter pilots.
What Erdogan feared
Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the coup, Erdogan had two concerns: the degraded capabilities of the Turkish Air Force, which had lost half of its fighter pilots, and the need to shield the system against any future mutiny by the Air Force, which relied on American-made fighter jets like the F-16. "The acquisition of the S-400 may, in short, be part of Erdogan's hedging strategy against another coup, both by deepening his strategic relationship with Russia and by acquiring specific air defenses intended to counter a new attempt to overthrow him," CSIS stated in its research paper. "One reason why Erdogan may have chosen to buy from Russia instead of a NATO ally is that he may have been wary of his own air force, which played a major role in the July 15, 2016 coup attempt," US officials told Reuters in 2019. Erdogan also wanted to send a strategic message to the US that Turkey had other options. Ankara blamed the late cleric Fethullah Gulen, who resided in the US and was a former ally of Erdogan, as the mastermind of the plot. The perception in Turkey was that the coup had the tactical support of the US. By reconciling Turkey with Russia, Erdogan wanted to impose a strategic cost on Washington.
www.bankingnews.gr
Σχόλια αναγνωστών