In the Turkish Press and Social Media, angry reactions and scenarios of “external intervention” have been identified.
At the center of Turkish suspicion is Israel and a recent article by Israeli analyst Shay Gal, former executive of Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), published in the newspaper Israel Hayom on 2 January 2026 on the occasion of the landing of a Turkish F-16 in Mogadishu in Somalia, which he described as a “violation of allied discipline” by Ankara.
The Israeli analyst himself limited his response to the rumors by stating that the F-35 and the upgrade of the F-16s are definitively closed for Turkey, even expressing his condolences to the family of the Turkish pilot who was killed.
Για την Άγκυρα, το F-35 τελείωσε οριστικά· και τα F-16 τίθενται σε αναστολή μέσω συντήρησης, αναβαθμίσεων και λογισμικού.
— Shay Gal שי גל (@ShayGal84) February 26, 2026
Μπαλικεσίρ. Πτώση F-16.
Σε κάθε σοβαρή Πολεμική Αεροπορία αυτό σημαίνει ένα πράγμα: πορίσματα. Τεχνικός, θεσμικός, πειθαρχημένος έλεγχος. Όχι θόρυβος. Όχι…
Haber 7: “Deep suspicions of external intervention”
The news network Haber 7, in its report, wonders whether it was a technical failure or something much darker.
The specific publication claims that the Israeli had referred to “stopping Turkish F-16s via software,” linking the death of the pilot, who did not abandon the aircraft until the last moment, with an attempt at strategic weakening of Turkey.
“Accidental incident or strategic ultimatum?”
The well-known journalist of the TV station TV5, Abdulhalim Meşe, appeared even more categorical. “Is it possible that the crash of four military aircraft in the region, including an Iranian helicopter, in the last 48 hours is a coincidence?” he asked.
Meşe directly linked the incident to the alleged statement of Shay Gal about the “neutralization of the Turkish F-16 fleet,” arguing that it may not be an accident, but a “strategic message” from the United States and Israel to Ankara, amid rising tension in the Middle East.
Balıkesir 9'uncu Ana Jet Üssü'nden kalkan F-16 uçağımızın düşmesi gerçekten sadece mekanik bir kaza mı?
— Abdulhalim Meşe (@ahalimmese) February 25, 2026
İsrail Havacılık ve Uzay Sanayii (IAI) yöneticisi Shay Gal'in, Türk F-16 filosunun "işlevsiz hale getirilmesi" gerektiği yönündeki açık tehditlerinin hemen ardından bu olayın… pic.twitter.com/ZkgJknHb19
The controversial article that sparked… suspicions:
An Israeli official threatens Turkey’s F-16s, while presenting Athens as a critical factor in the redesign of the balance of power.
Shay Gal, director of external relations at Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), the weapons manufacturing company in Israel, in his article in the Israeli press directly targets Turkey and specifically the Turkish F-16 fleet, threatening interventions at the level of software and operational support.
F-16s targeted after F-35s
Shay Gal argues that the exclusion of Turkey from the F-35 program is not sufficient and that the next step must be the weakening of the backbone of Turkish air power.
In his article in the newspaper Israel Hayom, he states characteristically:
“The issue is no longer access to the F-35.
The issue is how quickly we will put out of action the operational reliability of the Turkish F-16s.
Not theoretically. Practically.
Operation, software, access.
The relevant preparations are already underway.”
Gal argued that the F-16s are “not deserved” by Turkey, but are a “privilege” granted to it by the West.
“Vote of confidence” in Greece
Particular impression is caused by the part of the article where Gal appears to assign a role to Greece in limiting Turkish power, directly challenging Turkish positions in the Aegean and in the eastern Mediterranean.
Gal argued that overflights in the Aegean violate the rules of NATO.
He compared Russia’s violations in the war in Ukraine with those of Turkey in the Aegean, saying that Ankara’s are by far more numerous.
He stated that Israel and Greece cooperate to break Turkey’s power.
Turkey targeted over Libya and Somalia.
Gal strongly criticizes Turkey’s military presence in the Horn of Africa and specifically in Mogadishu, as well as the maritime jurisdiction agreements with Libya.
According to the analyst:
For decades, the F-16 symbolized Western control: American technology under alliance discipline.
This week, that premise collapsed on a runway in Mogadishu, with Turkey flying American-origin F-16s in Somalia under the label of counterterrorism.
This framework is the enforcement criterion. The issue is no longer procurement but operational doctrine:
whether the United States and its allies still enforce the rules governing their own air power or whether those rules now exist only on paper, as Ankara shows it can redeploy American fighter aircraft into contested theaters at will, without constraints or consequences.
The timing was deliberate.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland disrupted a balance that Turkey has spent a decade building in the Horn of Africa.
Erdogan condemned the move within days. Diplomatic alignment followed.
The arrival of fighter aircraft was the driving base.
The audience is broader: Somaliland, potential supporters and Washington itself.
This is why the F-16 problem is more corrosive than the S-400s. One was a transaction.
The other is operational doctrine addressed to allies.
In the Aegean, violence has not been normalized.
Greek authorities have recorded repeated violations of sovereign airspace and aviation rules by Turkish military aircraft, including F-16s.
These are not local complaints.
The pattern is recorded in the flight information regions of Athens and Nicosia and submitted to the United Nations, with documents of the Security Council and the General Assembly detailing unauthorized activity.
This is not a semantic dispute over nautical miles.
It is the systematic erosion of the air sovereignty of a NATO or European Union member state by another NATO member, using platforms supported by the United States.
The scale is the warning.
During the war in Ukraine, violations of NATO member states’ airspace by Russia have been counted in single digits.
Turkey’s violations against a single ally amount to hundreds.
Over Cyprus, Turkey does not challenge policy. It challenges the map. Turkish F-16s have repeatedly entered Cypriot airspace and flight information zones without authorization, including low-altitude passes near sensitive lines.
When such aircraft also operate from the occupied north, this is no longer a marginal violation.
It is sovereignty claimed by force, projected from territory that the United Nations recognizes as occupied.
Air power is laundered through occupation. That is why these incidents are recorded in UN files: sustained aerial coercion, not episodic friction.
The same aircraft support Turkey’s coercive campaign against Kurdish communities.
In northern Syria and northern Iraq, F-16 strikes impose cross-border faits accomplis, often near populated areas, with repeated reports of harm to civilians.
Within Turkey, aerial intimidation has at times targeted provinces with Kurdish majorities, blurring the line between counterterrorism and collective punishment of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin. Ankara calls this self-defense.
In practice, it is air power used to discipline a people, criminalize political identity and impose obedience from the air, replacing law with force.
Libya follows the same logic.
Turkey intervened decisively in a civil war on the basis of contested agreements, violated international arms restrictions and reshaped the balance of power on the ground.
UN reports and European monitoring missions have repeatedly pointed out violations of the Libya arms embargo, enabled through air corridors and continuous airlift.
Unmanned systems featured prominently, but the doctrine remained unchanged: air power as political engineering, not as lawful defense of last resort.
Somalia completes the arc.
For years, Turkey has built hard power there: a permanent military base, training missions, political alliance and energy ambitions. The arrival of F-16s is not a counterterrorism episode.
It is the exposed tip of an integrated project in which military presence, diplomatic pressure and economic positioning converge under air power.
This is precisely where Western enforcement fails. In practice, end-use monitoring tracks custody and not operational use.
Even United States oversight assessments acknowledge that existing mechanisms are not designed to detect unauthorized operational use of American defense articles.
The gap is political and not technical, leaving misuse unproven, unclassified and unpunished.
Leverage does not end with delivery.
The precedent of Pakistan proves it.
Washington froze F-16 deliveries, conditioned maintenance and directly linked monitoring to operational compliance.
End-use enforcement was applied through sustainment, upgrades and access.
The result is an alliance paradox that borders on self-sabotage. Turkish F-16s defend NATO airspace in Romania and Estonia, while Turkey’s broader air posture treats Greek and Cypriot sovereignty as negotiable.
The same aircraft. The same crews. The same support. Defense in the east. Coercion in the south.
Legally, there is no ambiguity.
Arms transfers from the United States are linked to a purpose.
Defense articles are provided for internal security, lawful self-defense and collective security under binding FMS agreements. End use is a condition.
When American-origin F-16s are used for coercive overflights, systematic pressure on sovereignty and intimidation of partners, this goes beyond diplomacy and challenges the foundations of the American arms transfer regime.
Washington has tools.
Support can be conditioned or suspended, including upgrades, mission software and sustainment.
Congress has tested these levers, including in the context of Turkey–Greece.
The claim that delivery ends leverage does not withstand scrutiny.
Europe is not a spectator. This is not a bilateral dispute. Greek and Cypriot airspace constitute the external air borders of Europe and the operational space of NATO.
Ambiguity is the currency that Ankara exploits. Lifting it is a European responsibility.
The issue of the F-35s has returned and the reflex is familiar: to resolve the issue of the S-400s and keep Turkey anchored in the West. This reflex is wrong.
The S-400s were a symptom. The core problem is operational doctrine. Turkey’s future stealth fleet is not intended for confrontation with Russia or Iran, with whom Ankara maintains functional arrangements through energy, trade, de-escalation in Syria and the Astana line.
Fifth-generation aircraft will instead be used where Turkey already exerts pressure: over Greece and Cyprus, against other partners of the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean, and explicitly against Israel, including Syrian airspace and the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel reads this pattern. Greece lives under it.
On this trajectory, such an encounter is increasingly read as a matter of timing rather than possibility, and Jerusalem adjusts its posture accordingly.
Mogadishu is the proof point.
The West’s silence has become operational capability.
The issue is no longer access to the F-35s, but how quickly Turkish F-16s are deprived of operational viability. The relevant preparations are already underway.
That is why the F-16 story is the real F-35 story.
It tests whether rules still apply when enforcing them is inconvenient, whether alliance means shared defense or shared logistics, and whether sovereignty remains a principle and not a bargaining chip.
Those who understand how Washington actually functions know where this will be decided, not in presidential calls, but across Congress, the Pentagon, the Department of State and the sustainment chain, with Athens and Jerusalem.
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