Europe and Greece find themselves exposed to the ultimate nightmare owing to... the outgoing or, rather, «expired» French President Emmanuel Macron.
Specifically, according to the Center for Strategic and Contemporary Research, the collapse of the New START treaty framework between Russia and the United States on February 5, 2026, combined with the war between Iran and the US in the Middle East, has accelerated developments.
At the same time, the stance of the administration of Donald Trump toward Russia, alongside threats to annex Greenland, a territory belonging to NATO ally Denmark, have amplified doubts as to whether European nations can continue to rely unreservedly on American security guarantees.
For eight decades, European security rested largely on the commitment of the US that an attack against one ally would be deemed an attack against all.
This commitment was backed by the power of the American nuclear arsenal.
Today, however, uncertainties in the international nuclear order are testing the foundations of this system.
France raises the nuclear stakes
On March 2, 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France would increase its nuclear arsenal, concurrently paving the way for a new European dimension in nuclear deterrence.
Yet the decision is not confined to reinforcing French nuclear capabilities.
Paris seeks to permit the temporary deployment of nuclear-capable Rafale aircraft on the territory of willing European allies, within the framework of so-called «forward deterrence».
Among the countries invited to take part in nuclear war games and exercises are Poland, Greece, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, and Denmark.
Greek participation assumes particular significance within this shifting framework, as Athens is explicitly included among the European capitals summoned to evaluate their role in the new deterrence architecture.
The invitation, however, does not equate to a decision to base French nuclear weapons in Greece, nor does it automatically entail assuming specific operational commitments.
The critical element is that France seeks to broaden the participation of European allies in nuclear deterrence without relinquishing control over the final decision to use nuclear weapons.
This authority will remain exclusively with the President of France.
Concurrently, Paris decided to halt public declarations regarding the size of its nuclear stockpile, curtailing transparency regarding the precise scope of its capabilities.
Nuclear umbrella
The pivot by France is tied to mounting uncertainty in transatlantic relations.
The second presidency of Donald Trump has overturned conventional assumptions regarding burden-sharing in NATO, while the American security strategy for 2026 shifts a greater share of conventional defense onto European allies, maintaining for the US a limited yet vital supporting role.
Collective defense obligations, as enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, remain in effect.
However, the alteration of American strategy and widening doubts over the credibility of security guarantees have reignited the debate over European strategic autonomy.
France is attempting to fill part of this vacuum.
Emmanuel Macron aims to enhance the European role in deterrence by capitalizing on the French nuclear arsenal and establishing a framework of cooperation with willing European nations.
Nonetheless, a fundamental limitation persists: the French initiative does not constitute, to date, the equivalent of a binding collective nuclear guarantee comparable to that associated with American deterrence.
Without binding security guarantees and a joint decision-making mechanism, French nuclear cooperation can supplement, but not fully supplant, the American nuclear umbrella.
The cost of nuclear power
Until now, France maintained a doctrine of strict sufficiency, aiming to field the necessary nuclear capabilities to deter threats without pursuing the open-ended expansion of its arsenal.
Its existing stockpile counts 290 nuclear warheads, which can be delivered by submarines and aircraft.
Emmanuel Macron announced an increase in their number, signaling a significant shift in the nuclear strategy of Paris.
France expends approximately 6.04 billion dollars annually on maintaining its nuclear arsenal and constitutes the fourth-largest nuclear power globally, behind the US, Russia, and the United Kingdom.
Despite bolstering its capabilities, France retains nuclear decision-making under the exclusive control of its president.
Macron has also stated that transparency toward Washington and coordination with the nuclear mission of NATO will be ensured.
The trajectory is clear: Europe seeks to reinforce its collective defense in an environment where traditional guarantees are no longer taken for granted.
Germany, Poland, and Britain change the parameters
The French initiative gains greater weight due to parallel moves by other European powers.
At the Munich Security Conference in February 2026, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz pledged to deepen cooperation with France in nuclear deterrence, stressing that the two nations must grow stronger together.
Concurrently, he confirmed the coordination of the Franco-German steering group on nuclear matters.
The participation of conventional German forces in French nuclear exercises represents one indicator of this heightened cooperation.
Berlin, however, maintains reservations.
Germany has stated that it will continue to honor its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and has no intention of creating zones of differentiated security.
Although it pursues closer cooperation with Paris, it is not prepared to make its security entirely dependent on France.
At the same time, Poland has disclosed that it is in consultations with France and other European allies to bolster nuclear deterrence, while voicing interest in preparing Warsaw should autonomous actions in the nuclear realm be required.
France and the United Kingdom, for their part, signed the Northwood Declaration in 2025, aiming to strengthen nuclear cooperation through joint submarine patrols and coordinated strategic planning.
This represents a development that connects, for the first time, two independent nuclear powers of Europe within a shared cooperation framework.
The Netherlands and Belgium, which already host American B61 nuclear bombs, have also expressed interest in participating in the French deterrence framework.
The risk
The enhancement of French nuclear deterrence does not concern European defense alone.
It also raises questions regarding the viability of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The prevailing architecture was founded largely on American protection of non-nuclear European states.
In exchange for refraining from acquiring nuclear capabilities, these states relied on the deterrence provided by the US and the overarching security architecture of NATO.
Establishing a stronger European nuclear framework may weaken the effectiveness of this balance, particularly if it leads to increased reliance on nuclear capabilities without clear and binding rules for collective decision-making.
At the same time, the operational implementation of French forward deterrence remains vague.
Paris has not offered a formal guarantee via a new binding treaty, nor does it intend to limit the exclusive authority of the French president over the decision to employ nuclear arms.
In other words, France seeks to broaden the European dimension of deterrence without converting its nuclear stockpile into a collective European arsenal governed by shared authority.
For Greece, its inclusion among the countries invited by Emmanuel Macron to take part in nuclear war games and exercises could prove exceptionally perilous.
American strategy transfers a greater share of defense responsibility to Europeans, and Paris attempts to upgrade its standing as a nuclear guarantor on a European scale.
However, this new reality is not yet accompanied by a clear, binding framework ensuring that European nations will enjoy mutual guarantees comparable to those associated with the American nuclear umbrella.
It should be noted that Greek participation in exercises does not in itself imply the acquisition of nuclear capabilities or the stationing of nuclear weapons on Greek soil.
It demonstrates, however, that Athens is included among the capitals summoned to evaluate their role in an altered European deterrence posture, where powers such as Russia and Iran will inevitably have their sights fixed upon it.
In any event, this nightmarish turning point and the doctrinal shift in France fundamentally dismantle the architecture of global nuclear non-proliferation.
Greece and Europe now stand on the brink of a dangerous precipice, locked into a nuclear chessboard of no return!
www.bankingnews.gr
Σχόλια αναγνωστών